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In creating an ‘economic miracle’, the post-war Japanese business system became the admired model of policy makers and business leaders worldwide. Explanations of rapid success veered between the developmental state, bank-led finance, cooperative inter-firm relations, employment practices, a unique culture, or any combination of these elements. Analysis identified a triangle of key actors - government, banks and big business – yet initially overlooked the integral contribution of SMEs. While later interpretations of the ‘miracle’ period partially corrected this imbalance, our knowledge of these firms remains limited, and, in comparison to Japan’s corporations, markedly so. With the perspectives of national bureaucrats and big business executives dictating our understanding of Japanese business history, our article focuses on the goals and actions of small enterprise leaders and their employees. The bursting of the ‘bubble economy’, in 1989-90, turned Japan from challenger of the Western economies into the subject of international criticism. SMEs acutely felt the consequences of failing growth rates and industrial restructuring, and could no longer rely on long-term relationships and supply chains dominated by big companies. This sudden turnabout in economic fortunes, during Japan’s so-called ‘lost’ decades, offers a well-defined opportunity to investigate major debates about SMEs, their management, and, specifically, their capacity to effect purposeful business strategies and transform their businesses. Crisis forced a reconfiguration of internal resources and competitive capabilities, and, to avoid closure, innovation in products and production methods. But rapid change in economic circumstances and industrial structure was just one major strategic issue confronting Japanese SMEs in the 1990s: equally concerning were pressing decisions about installing computerized machinery, which, seemingly, had the potential to replace existing production methods rooted in older, non-computerized tools and handcraft skills. Rival firms re-equipped with transformative technologies would, it was assumed, pose an existential threat to unrestructured businesses. Furthermore, the operational flexibility and efficiencies associated with numerical control and automation offered an available and increasingly persuasive strategic solution to reduced demand, falling prices, and over-dependency on supply-chains. For Japanese SMEs, the conversion from conventional subcontractor into flexible specialist meant acquiring the resources and capabilities to meet varied orders, customize products, and obtain new customers.
	Using in-depth cases, government reports, and national data, we present a needed account of Japan’s SMEs in the slow growth era of the 1990s and 2000s. We analyze and compare changes in production, technology and skills in two firms, Industrial Manufacturing Center Ltd (IMC) and Precion Co. Inc., which both fabricated sheet metals for machinery and other products. Responding to the economic crisis, these enterprises acquired computerized equipment and pursued flexible specialisation. Yet they achieved different outcomes. As a result, our research explores the other strategic and operational factors that governed the conversion from subcontractor. The gaps in our historical knowledge of Japan’s SMEs, their organizational characteristics, and innovation processes is especially regrettable for an important and unprecedented period of transformation. One interpretation perceives a ‘paradigm shift’.​[1]​ We investigate the development of systems and capabilities within the two case firms, and detail what any ‘paradigm shift’ meant in practice. After evaluating the influence of economic, structural and technological trends on the decisions of owner-managers, the study focuses on changes in organizational processes and operations.
	The article assesses two research questions. Firstly, in responding to waning relational subcontracting and transformative technologies, how effectively did Japanese SMEs between 1990 and 2008 revise their internal resources, products and production capabilities to become flexible specialists? Falling demand, re-ordered supply chains, and growing use of computerized machinery forced Japan’s SMEs to address core strategic issues of market positioning, technological sophistication, and product development.​[2]​ Our cases reveal the direct influence of factors external to the firm, namely economic and technological change, and important decisions by owner-managers. They show, additionally, the role of reformulated internal operational routines, involving owner-managers and engineers, in achieving sustainable strategic transformation. Firms discovered that becoming a distinctive flexible specialist, defined as turning newly-installed technological resources into performance-enhancing capabilities, was more difficult than anticipated. One reason was exaggerated expectations about the ability of the latest production tools to fulfil all production and customer needs. Moreover, because computerization and automation were widely available, they could not by themselves be a source of competitive differentiation and long-term advantage. The case studies concentrate, therefore, on the complex processes of organizational change that followed the introduction of new machinery. Rather than just the adoption of leading technologies, it was their unique combination with existing experience, skills and machinery that created distinctive capabilities and competitive differentiation. Secondly, to what extent can the strategic successes and failures of Japanese SMEs between 1990 and 2008 supply general insights? To elucidate this issue, we draw on major ideas in business strategy and the goals of SMEs.
	Before detailing the IMC and Precion cases, the article considers in turn the two key external factors, namely economic restructuring and technological advances, that shaped the fortunes of SMEs after 1990. We begin, therefore, with an historical survey of relational subcontracting and production pyramids, and assess their particular importance to Japanese manufacturing. The article discusses how the bursting of the bubble economy and the reaction of large companies threatened a well-established system, and how economic restructuring forced SMEs in the 1990s into strategic realignment. An analysis of major developments in production technology follows, including the ways in which flexible specialization appeared an apposite response to a contemporary crisis. The next section describes the core aims of SME strategy, and their relation to economic restructuring and technological change during 1990-2008. Based on the production and product problems confronting Japanese SMEs, the section explains the choice of case firms and their analysis. After our accounts of IMC and Precion, the article concludes by addressing the research questions.

Japanese SME Networks and Economic Restructuring









Employment in a recognized corporation bestowed social status, higher pay, regular promotion, and steady employment. SMEs implied economic backwardness, low productivity, old technologies, and cheap labour.​[13]​ In 1963, the Basic Small Business Law defined SMEs as having less than 300 employees, reiterated their role within supply chains, and urged improvements in management, skills, and machinery.​[14]​ Some 24.2 per cent of Japanese SMEs, in 1966, stated that they had only a single customer; 18.6 per cent had several main customers; some 10.6 per cent engaged in a mix of subcontracting and independent sales; and, therefore, a total of 53.4 per cent declared involvement in some form of subcontracting.​[15]​ Government policy slowly acknowledged the limits of scale economies and the benefits of industrial diversity.​[16]​ It accordingly encouraged horizontal links and cooperative associations in specialized production and handcrafts, such as those in textiles, houseware and food.​[17]​ In 1982, enterprises with less than 100 employees accounted for approximately two-thirds of private sector personnel, and those employing between 4-299 employees were responsible for 51.9 per cent of manufacturing value-added.​[18]​ By 1991, average wage levels in firms with 30-99 and 100-299 employees were respectively 73.6 and 81.2 per cent of those sized 1,000-4,999. Smaller firms remained more inclined to use ‘non-permanent’ labour.​[19]​
The latter half of the 1980s witnessed financial deregulation, easy credit, and an asset bubble. The fall in property and share prices that followed 1989-90 cast doubts on Japan’s corporate governance, and challenged the viability of its economic model. An era of deflation, low growth, and industrial restructuring began, involving a banking crisis during 1997-98, with the recession seeing partial recovery by 2000-01 (Table 1). The unravelling of an industrial system exposed the strategic weaknesses of SMEs tied to production pyramids.​[20]​ The loss of stable orders and revenues undermined the foundations of relational subcontracting. Contemporary commentators perceived the hollowing-out of SMEs after 1990 as hastening longer-term challenges for SMEs: they noted the growing sophistication of demand, market segmentation, internationalization, the relocation of production overseas, and technological progress. All these developments, it was argued, required subcontractors to operate more independently. One factor, it was contended, would favour SMEs: new flexible production machinery could greatly enhance their competitive advantage.​[21]​




Flexible Specialization in Japan

Piore and Sabel, famously, devised the term ‘flexible specialization’. They denied the link between industrial efficiency and mass production, which relied on single-purpose machines, unskilled labour, and the production of standardized goods. Instead, Piore and Sabel pointed to other historically significant forms of production organization.​[25]​ Scranton’s account of US manufacturing, from the late 19th century to the 1920s, similarly re-evaluates mass production. Speciality producers pioneered technological and organizational transformations distinct from routinized assembly, bureaucratic management, and oligopolistic competition. Alongside mass standardised flow production, often labelled Fordism, was bulk production, connected to staple goods and simple technologies. It lowered prices by systemizing output, but did not standardize products. Batch production was potentially large-scale and capital-intensive, but it responded to unpredictable, ‘lumpy’ or varied customer orders. Machinery and engineering projects required different production systems to mass manufactured automobiles or branded packaged goods. Custom production, usually small scale, crafted a single product to meet a specific customer order. Both batch and custom manufacturing needed flexibility and specialization, and complex specifications and differentiated products could assume priority over price competition. Unlike mass producers, with routinized inflexible systems, other firms relied on adjustable, general purpose machinery and skilled workers. Firms could combine a mix of approaches. Although the 1920s saw the rise of mass manufacturing and large enterprises, in the US and Europe, production systems and product markets continued to vary.​[26]​ Flexibility and specialization expanded alongside standardization and mass production. In Japan, post-war large-scale manufacturing achieved competitiveness through higher levels of flexibility than in the US or Western Europe, as evidenced by lean production, multi-skilling, just-in-time, and responsive subcontracting networks.​[27]​ Traditional craft skills, operational flexibility, investments in machinery, cost cutting, and product development within SMEs all contributed to Japan’s post-war success. When writing in the 1980s, Piore and Sabel perceived flexible specialization as defining ‘post-Fordist’ societies. Cooperative networks and specialist subcontracting (distinct from production networks dominated by large firms) would be another characteristic. Piore and Sabel argued that computerized machines and data reduced the advantages of scale, and supported cost-effective batch production. In contrast to large companies, flexible specialists could switch nimbly between customers during periods of economic turbulence. Critics doubted the demise of mass markets and producers, and questioned the ability of resource-limited SMEs to innovate or implement significant changes in product and production strategies. Piore and Sabel held an optimistic vision of differentiated, innovation-led, high-skilled production; they underestimated, arguably, technology’s potential for work intensification and de-skilling. CNC (or Computerized Numerical Control) machines had originated in the US, and, by the 1970s, integrated CAD/CAM (Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacture) had become commercially available. Over the next decade, Japan emerged as the biggest manufacturer and user of CNC machine-tools, with their rapidly-improving functionality and falling prices. Their technological sophistication and utility improved accuracy, and programming facilitated set-up times, operational agility, and specialized production runs. Automation replaced labour and established skills.​[28]​ Yet it was the post-bubble crisis, the cancellation of major orders, or the threat of closure that led to substantial numbers of Japanese SMEs extensively installing already-available CNC machinery.​[29]​ As a result, contemporary observers viewed Japanese small businesses as transforming themselves into ‘flexible specialists’, with CNC machines creating gains in production methods, batch processes, costs, and product quality. With notable exaggeration, they interpreted flexible specialization as turning subcontractors into the collaborating equals of large companies.​[30]​
There is danger in simply assuming that Japan’s SMEs were by the 1990s devoid of innovative capabilities or the capacity to change. Many had more than one customer, and would regularly compete for new orders. Investments in plant and machinery secured or retained major clients. Retirement among older craftsmen and the disinclination of younger employees towards traditional skills necessitated the installation of CNC machines. Yet the subcontracting system and dependency on large orders inevitably curtailed production flexibility, and limited strategic options.​[31]​ Technological change appeared as both competitive opportunity and threat during a time of economic uncertainty and supply chain restructuring.​[32]​
Historical evidence about the impact of new technology on the activities and performance of firms is limited and little understood. As our case studies reveal, SMEs could mistakenly believe that CNC machinery automatically brought the capacity to thrive in the post-bubble economy. In reality, some 53 per cent of surveyed Japanese SMEs, in 2000, reported that established handcraft skills retained their importance and could not be mechanised; 43.8 per cent that technology could not fulfil diverse customer requirements; and 31.0 per cent that traditional techniques allowed flexible responses to design changes.​[33]​ Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, craft techniques and older machinery continued to offer specific operational advantages that CNC tools could not substitute. Since rivals could imitate the example of early users, the new technology was, by itself, a strategically-insufficient solution.

Analyzing SME Strategies: the Japanese Case

In general, four key factors influence and determine SME strategies: external equity, market positioning, new products, and technological sophistication.​[34]​ With traditions of personal control or family inheritance being markedly strong in Japanese SMEs, they commonly relied on long-term bank support. Owners characteristically sought to remain ‘lord of the castle’, and avoided outside shareholders. During the 1990s, over 70 per cent of firms employing less than 300 people continued to declare no interest in external equity, and, after internal revenues, banks remained their main means of finance. With cuts in production capacity and employee numbers, borrowing inevitably fell over the decade.​[35]​ IMC and Precion reported good relations with their banks, and finance was no strategic barrier to their investing in new production equipment and computerized machines.​[36]​ Market positioning enables SMEs to exploit established products more successfully, or to maximize product developments.​[37]​ When large manufacturers in Japan transferred production overseas and moved away from conventional contracting, matters of market positioning, greater independence, and enhanced product development constituted urgent strategic considerations for SMEs.​[38]​ Subcontracting had previously resolved or confirmed market position within supply chains. They exercised, it follows, limited choices over product development, production methods, and technological upgrading. The 1990s pointed to re-appraisal: some 70 per cent of SMEs claimed to have pursued product differentiation.​[39]​ Regarding technological sophistication, Japanese firms had to evaluate their mix of manual skills, human abilities, and machinery, and decide on their willingness or capacity to invest in leading-edge equipment. CNC machines, in principle, bestowed the production flexibility needed to compete for customers, and enabled specialization in high value products and services. Flexible specialization appeared an available alternative to a production architecture and product range designed for supply chains.
Through case-studies, we address the ability of Japan’s SMEs to transform their market position, production, and products through new equipment and technology. As we shall see, aspirations to convert from subcontractor to flexible specialist led to the installation of CNC machinery. To achieve intended strategic outcomes, SMEs had to integrate their new equipment into their existing production systems, and create new or augmented combinations of assets. The resource-based view (RBV) interprets business strategy as firms utilizing heterogeneous internal resources - such as finance, equipment, technology, knowledge, skills, and production and product development systems - to create a sustainable competitive advantage over rivals.​[40]​ Resources contribute to competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, imperfectly mobile between firms, and non-substitutable. As exampled by Japanese SMEs converting into flexible specialists after 1990, both distinct individual resources and systemic resources that optimize different assets within a firm have relevance. It is the exploitation and not the existence of resources that underpins durable performance. The firm’s capabilities determine the capacity of combined resources to perform a task or activity.​[41]​ Complex internal organizational patterns, built through learning routines and repetition, grow along an incremental development path.​[42]​ A ‘systemic resource’ derives value and uniqueness from being a vital part of a system.​[43]​ By retaining a variety of production options, technologies, and skills, Japanese SMEs maximized operational flexibility, customer responsiveness, and product diversity. Our case-studies identify both individual skills and resources and their systemic linkages, and map out production systems and internal competence transformation over time.
	The RBV provides a useful framework for understanding how firms build sustainable and specialized competitive capabilities from their ‘feedstock’ of internal resources. On the other hand, it says little about how firms adapt specialised resources and capabilities in changed circumstances.​[44]​ The RBV does not explain how firms maintain competitive advantage over time, or, as illustrated so clearly in post-bubble Japan, respond to periods of turbulence.​[45]​ The Dynamic Capabilities approach attempts to describe how firms build new competencies or reconfigure existing ones in an altered external environment. In the case of the RBV, internally-generated differentiating capabilities enable firms to compete more effectively or to acquire a lead in the external marketplace; for Dynamic Capabilities, the external environment shapes the formation of differentiating capabilities within firms, and, to survive long-term, changes in external conditions necessitate the reconfiguration of internal capabilities. Critics have commented on the RBV’s inability to distinguish clearly between resources and capabilities, leaving its analytical approach vulnerable to accusations of tautology. Similarly, empirically demonstrating the existence and workings of Dynamic Capabilities presents well-acknowledged problems.​[46]​ Our historical review of Japanese SMEs, therefore, explores how firms responded in different ways to transformed economic and technological circumstances, and, as they sought conversion into flexible specialists, it pinpoints stages in internal reconfigurations of resources and capabilities. The cases support the Dynamic Capabilities school that stresses the significant role of owner-managers in sensing changing conditions and seizing new opportunities. They show, too, that existing SMEs had the capability to transform their competitive fortunes during a period rapid economic and technological change.​[47]​ Our analysis highlights, therefore, the impact of external factors on the internal evolving systems of firms. But it acknowledges how sustainable differentiated resources and long-term flexibility stemmed directly from the internal interactions of owner-managers, engineers and key personnel, and from the inculcation of new or improved systems and routines in product development and production.​[48]​




Our research investigates what strategic transformation through flexible specialization meant for SMEs as a process and as outcome. For research purposes, SMEs have the advantage of being at a scale small enough to identify and track the evolution of varied resources and capabilities. Through case studies, we are able to show the interplay of external forces and internal firm processes, and the resulting contribution of internal resources and capabilities to operations and performance. In his insightful survey, Whittaker reveals how Japan’s small firms differed in character from the corporations one-sidedly depicted as the ‘Japanese enterprise model’. He notes how industrial restructuring, the overseas relocation of production, insecure demand, and falling prices signalled in the 1990s severe challenges for SMEs.​[57]​ Whittaker discusses the emerging threat, but, at the time of writing, he cannot describe the fate of small firms during the low growth era that followed. Possible outcomes included the polar opposites of ‘hollowing-out’ and a ‘paradigm shift’.​[58]​ Our research looks in detail at the capacity of Japanese SMEs to undertake a strategic transformation during rapidly-changing circumstances. The cases demonstrate, moreover, the valuable contribution that historical methods and longitudinal case-studies can make in demonstrating the internal processes of firms reacting to a changing landscape.​[59]​




Strategic Dependency versus New Technology: IMC

Archetypal Subcontractor: 1967-1995





In 1995, Shunichiro Namiki, the founder’s son, succeeded as managing director, and embarked on supplementing IMC’s price-sensitive manufacturing with niche markets and product quality. Using his experience as a product designer for a large machine firm, Namiki introduced CAD/CAM to transform IMC’s production system, and, specifically, to fulfil the potential of an under-utilized CNC turret-punch press. The firm acquired the ability to receive customer data electronically, and the central database it created allowed changes to product or component designs. Potentially, CAD/CAM could transform production planning, and automate the cutting and pressing of sheet metal. This new facility, potentially, challenged the operational control and status of the engineers. While it was possible to download CAD/CAM data to the CNC turret-punch press, the number of applications had been limited. In the event, CAD/CAM remained a stand-alone function separate from the other unaltered production processes, and the firm remained, noticeably, a conventional subcontractor in its operational methods, priorities, and narrow sales base.​[64]​ Excepting those involved in CAD/CAM design, most IMC engineers continued with their recognised craft methods and mechanical equipment, and, revealingly, those engaged in the long-established blanking and bending stages held the highest levels of skills and experience (Figure 1).

Second Reconfiguration: 1998
When, during 1998, Japan’s economic difficulties worsened, and its main customer went bankrupt, IMC overnight lost half its sales revenue. Operating profits reached a low of -9.2 per cent, against the national SMM average of 1.7, reversing respective returns of 5.8 and 2.6 per cent the year previously.​[65]​ Confronted with a crisis, Namiki followed his belief in transformative technologies. He set out wholly to cease reliance on conventional machinery and craftsmanship, and to convert IMC into a fully ‘modern’ factory. More sophisticated manufacturing methods would, it was argued, bring greater customer responsiveness and product differentiation.​[66]​ To secure orders and long production runs, Namiki believed that computerized flexible manufacturing had become critical to the large-scale batch efficiency he aspired to implement. Reflecting on recent experience with CAD/CAM, he judged that ‘the most important thing should be to organise these important elements systematically’, transforming processes and deepening links between production stages. In this task, he argued, the managing director would be the prime mover, and the chief reason for success or failure.​[67]​




The separateness of laser cutting from much of the production system hindered the building of capabilities in manufacturing flexibility and batch-production. Within a few years, the laser cutter lost its competitive advantage. Little integrated into a distinctive production system, rival firms easily copied its functionality. The problem was especially difficult for IMC, whose shearing, set press and bending skills were similarly commonplace. The costly automated welding facilities were poorly suited to small batch production and multiple lines, and, in reverting back to manual welding, the firm undertook training in skills very recently relinquished.​[74]​ While the CAD/CAM engineers could computerize customer data for production, IMC did not develop the capability for customizing products.​[75]​ Connections between CAD/CAM, design skills, and machining processes were highly restricted, despite such linkages remaining a major strategic objective (Table 7). High competence levels in CAD/CAM rested with the same two expert engineers throughout 1996 to 2005. Since employees involved in CAD/CAM but without highly-rated skills almost doubled from 2002 onwards, the average expertise level at the firm became diluted. Blanking skills and expertise with the CNC machines (the LCV-3012B and the BPEGA357) did not improve, and fell from 2001; bending and welding techniques followed the same pattern. The number of expert engineers engaged in CAD/CAM design, blanking, bending or welding did not increase, and interactions between design and production showed a long-term decline (Table 7). Knowledge diffusion and differentiation in products or production within the firm could not, as a result, fulfil Namiki’s expressed strategic objectives.​[76]​

Third Reconfiguration in 2002
By 2002, IMC had not upgraded from conventional subcontractor to flexible specialist. CAD/CAM and laser blanking aside, individual engineers continued to control the production of particular product lines, and inhibited the emergence of new routines and techniques. They also saw themselves as being de-skilled.​[77]​ Namiki had been reluctant to challenge the practices of his father and the subordinates he had appointed. Small Japanese manufacturers regarded the emergence of distinct computerized and conventional ‘language’ groups as problematic, and workplace tensions could disrupt production. In deciding every production plan, including choice of materials, machines, and cutting tools, CAD/CAM programmers had gained oversight but not control of operations.​[78]​ In their role, they were unable to increase skill linkages, or generate production and product innovations.

All decisions are made in the office, not in the factory. The managing director and the CAD/CAM programmers discuss issues among themselves, and what we do is to manufacture goods under their decisions and supervision…This created conflict with the older engineers, often relegated to less skilful downstream activities...​[79]​

From 2002, Namiki abandoned conventional cutting machinery, and pursued differentiation through greater use of new technologies. Instead of evaluating each machine and process, or their contribution to overall effectiveness, IMC looked to new technology to overcome its strategic impasse.

It was a common trend that small manufacturers replaced an old set of cutting machines, called mechanical cutters, with a new set, such as laser cutters and punch presses, around the turn of the century. At that time, the new machines were very expensive, because they had just gone on the market. Therefore, if a firm had a laser cutter, it could highly differentiate its production from competitors.​[80]​

It was questionable if, in the long term, the available new production technologies by themselves could achieve the goals of flexibility or specialization, and, in the short term, competence might be lost before being replaced.​[81]​ Figure 3 shows the resulting production architecture. The skills associated with shearing and set press processes disappeared, and skill linkages and the capacity to differentiate fell markedly. By ceasing to use the older equipment, Namiki inevitably reduced the variety of production facilities, in the hope that new technology would generate net advantages. He thought it necessary to replace skills he now regarded as redundant. As a result, Namiki had to tackle matters of personnel, observing that:









Flexible Specialization and Systemic Resources: Precion

Subcontractor Capabilities: 1961-2000
Etsuro Suzuki established his private firm, during 1961, as a provider of metal-cutting services, and he re-founded it, formally, as Suzuki Seiki Machinery Ltd ten years later. Tsuneyoshi Suzuki succeeded his father as managing director, during 1991, just as Japan’s economy was slowing. In the following year, wanting to meet the needs of existing customers more effectively, and to expand his business, Suzuki built a new factory in Kanuma City, Tochigi prefecture, north-east of Tokyo, creating Suzuki Precion Co. Inc. The plant used several types of cutting machines to fabricate sheet metal, and manufactured for numerous firms and industries. But it operated principally as a subcontractor to three customers, with one hard disk device (HDD) producer accounting for over 70 per cent of sales. In 1996, Precion extended its capital to ￥20m, mainly to fund investment in new machinery.​[84]​ While the sharp economic downturn of 1997 hit the profits of Japan’s SMMs, Precion recovered quickly between 1998 and 2000. Thanks to the growing demand for HDDs, sales revenues reached ￥1bn.​[85]​ Although Precion sought greater differentiation in production capabilities, its growing dependence on a single customer locked the firm in as a conventional subcontractor.​[86]​

First Reconfiguration in 2000
From 2000, Tsuneyoshi Suzuki aimed to be a flexible specialist and to distinguish his production processes.

Since around 1995, a variety of new machines with multiple cutting functions had begun to go on the market... As we had sought uncertainly for the potential to expand our business, we decided to install the new CNC machines and specialise in the small-batch production of multiple products… [we] developed a bundle of skills and technology to manufacture highly intricate product shapes.​[87]​

Despite buying new CNC machines, Precion wanted to augment rather than replace existing craft skills. Computer engineers, who could learn their skills in two years, became increasingly available, and could not offer sustainable differentiation. In contrast to IMC, the production manager of Precion’s CNC precision lathe department defended the combined instilling and preserving of techniques:

The young engineers lack knowledge on cutting techniques, cutting tools, and the quality of materials. There is an implicit knowledge that engineers can learn only from experience. For example, when an experienced engineer looks at a production plan, he can immediately decide on the manufacturing machine, cutting tools, materials, and programming details.​[88]​

Precion introduced CAD/CAM as the central operating system for CNC machinery and as the basis of its design skill. But, downstream, the firm relied on the experience of older engineers who implemented defining subtle adjustments in product development and production.​[89]​
CAD/CAM and computerized machines extended the firm’s range of production processes, and they brought about a reconfigured web of interlocking varied specializations and skills. Two new CNC precision lathes (the Takamatsu X-10 and the T-Wave) supported the manufacture of HDDs, and an automatic loader improved set-up times, accuracy, and quality.​[90]​ The T-Wave could process products within an accuracy of 0.1 microns, while the less accurate X-10 assisted mass production.​[91]​ A CNC machining center (the A55) became the main cutting equipment for Precion, and the combination of CAD/CAM with the A55 made it ‘possible to carve complicated shapes out of solid workpieces, so speeding production’.​[92]​ This ‘carving-out’ technique added production functionality, increased the skills pool, and established a machining center department equal in importance to its lathe counterpart. Production developed a multi-functional approach. The firm invested in ‘Swiss-type’ automatic lathes (the SV-12 and the SR-20R) to introduce greater flexibility and high-speed in the machining of sophisticated products, notably medical devices.​[93]​ Four production stages evolved, beginning with design, and moving on to three different cutting pathways. Located in the two lathe departments or the machining department, experienced engineers with CAD/CAM skills undertook product design, and used their acquired knowledge to integrate design with production.​[94]​ While the clear separation of production tasks according to machine types positively influenced efficiency, the integration between processes established flexibility and differentiation (Figure 5).
Comparisons of Figures 4 and 5 illustrate Precion’s transformation, from 2000, and the increasing complexity of its production web. New CAD/CAM skills connected to CNC machinery supported a strategy of design and improvement at each process stage. The firm continued to deepen capabilities in computerized design, until, by 2005, there were 11 engineers with expert, practical or basic CAD/CAM skills.​[95]​ The number of engineers using the CNC precision lathes rose from 6 in 2000 to 14 by 2005, with expert skills specifically increasing from 3 to 7; the two basic skills employed for cutting on the CNC multiple-function machining centers increased to three at expert or practical level, between 2001 and 2005. Importantly, the connectivity between CAD/CAM design and production processes strengthened overall from 2000 onwards. Precion simultaneously integrated the two ‘language’ groups engaged on the machining centers and the lathes. It linked conventional machining skills with those on the CNC tools, and interconnected precision lathe techniques with those for automatic lathes. While CNC machines had their own intrinsic advantages, Precion ensured that technological opportunities brought deeper connections with all processes. The firm, once a conventional subcontractor, succeeded in transforming itself into a flexible specialist with a wide range of hard-to-imitate production techniques.​[96]​ Precion’s operations manager summed up the outcome:





Second Reconfiguration in 2001-05
Precion lost its main customer to bankruptcy in 2001. Suzuki pondered closing the business, but decided instead to speed up the production and technological changes already being implemented.

Our overall strategic change had to start with new technological development, leading to the creation of our own unique technology, and finally differentiating our technological strengths from others, by developing original production techniques and methods.​[98]​

Precion implemented a phased series of changes, between 2001 and 2005, ultimately increasing its capital to ￥30m. The company renovated its factory, and introduced fine-cutting technology and a high-speed machining center.​[99]​

Precion’s total assets per employee gradually increased, and matched the average of SMMs by 2003.​[100]​ Figure 6 shows the culmination of changes in production architecture by 2005. The addition of further CNC machines in 2001, when combined with CAD/CAM and other CNC equipment, boosted the integration of computer and longer established skills. Two 5-axis machines, one installed in 2001, and another in 2005, increased the capability to shape complicated geometries. But, as a production manager at Precion pointed out, the core production philosophy remained:

Although machining centers [are] functionally enhanced, and able to carve intricately shaped products through technological developments, the skills to design products and plan production process are still human tasks. Expert engineers can picture production processes in their heads soon after receiving the production plans, immediately choose suitable machines and cutting tools, and programme the efficient tool-paths.​[101]​

The production manager argued that the more technology progressed, the more important it became to match individual engineering expertise with highly sophisticated machines. Specialised skills and knowledge, for carving intricate shapes in small batches with CNC machining centers, bolstered the differentiation strategy. Suzuki regarded overall skill development as a major contributor to the firm’s improved performance between 2001 and 2005, when the operating profit margin grew from 0.1% to 8.8%.​[102]​ He commented on the benefits of engineers with differing skills interacting:

I could see the capability of some engineers had been growing. I also recruited some young workers and conducted on-the-job training for them. Over the last five or six years, these young engineers became competent, and the co-operation between younger engineers and the elder workers seems to enhance their skill development process.​[103]​





On-the-job rather than formalized training was prevalent within Japanese SMEs, and key skills were commonly experiential and firm specific. Yamazaki, in 2002, and Yamamoto, in 2004, argue that on-the-job training demonstrated the firm-specific nature of skills, and the continued relationship between traditional hand-craft techniques and product development.​[105]​ During 2004, some 27.6 per cent of firms claimed that they had maintained skills or redeployed older workers. Only 11.4 per cent allocated specific human resources or procedures to training. Because SMEs could not attract young workers willing or able to learn conventional skills, the loss of older employees put valuable competencies and production processes at risk.​[106]​ With younger engineers preferring technology-related tasks, systemic interactions between different skills became operationally necessary for SMEs to sustain or improve competitive advantage. Precion used the installation of new equipment as opportunities to increase skills specialisation and skills integration. Moreover, while IMC merely transferred submitted data to CNC machines, Precion could through interactions between engineers improve the designs provided by customers. Co-operation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff and knowledge exchange between departments contributed to production flexibility and product differentiation.

Discussion: Systemizing Resources and Strategic Differentiation









	IMC and Precion attempted to avoid the fate of ‘hollowing-out’ through programmes of upgrading. While IMC did not escape the role of dependent sub-contractor, Precion achieved levels of flexibility and specialization. IMC’s strategy ultimately relied on replacing its craft-based skills and older machinery with new technology. In reducing the variedness of its production system, it shrank its functional scope and capabilities. The firm reflected a common contemporary view: that new technology offered a fast remedy to the problem of a suddenly-transformed business environment.​[111]​ Yet, at the time, automation could not replicate the finer tolerances of craft workers, and did not offer the most effective or efficient operational solution for every process or product. IMC’s differentiation and competitive capabilities stalled and declined. Precion combined new technology with craft-based skills and older machinery, and, evaluating experientially the advantages and disadvantages of each, built mixed modes of operation. It found ways to utilize, inter-connect and enhance new technology and established skills and processes. From the viewpoint of flexibility and specialisation, new technology could augment but not fully replace older techniques and methods.​[112]​ Precion encouraged traditional craftsmen to learn CAD/CAM and CNC skills, or to cooperate and interact with engineers familiar with newer techniques. Maintaining an evolutionary capability through the interactions of different personnel, skills and equipment underpinned distinctiveness in production and products.​[113]​
	At Precion, Suzuki was actively interested in recruiting and training. He recognised the ability of expert engineers independently to organize production, evaluate product and production needs, and choose between older and newer techniques or some combination. These processes gave Precion the capability to adapt and incrementally innovate products in collaboration with customers.​[114]​ The comparison between IMC and Precion is enlightening: they inherited similar operational traditions and production architecture, but their varying approaches, after 1997, had divergent consequences. Both firms proved that they had the capacity, strategically, to transform: in a period of turbulence, they were able to introduce new resources and change their operational architecture. But only Precion, in creating sustainable competitive-enhancing capabilities, converted from a mainly contracted supplier into a flexible specialist. Unlike IMC, Precion appreciated the need to retain diverse individual skills and equipment, and, over time and through experimentation, the contribution they could make to enhancing systemic resources and capabilities. Due to the size, limited resources and vulnerability of SMEs, an iterative approach that mixed and matched high-tech resources with older craft and machine resources proved effective in Japan during 1990-2008. The approach retained operational complexity, flexibility, and specialization, and developed opportunities for internally-generated, differentiated, and hard-to-imitate capabilities. It had the potential to create mind-sets and operational routines based on adaptability, and, as circumstances changed, it increased the chances of avoiding future obsolescence.​[115]​ With ‘mix and match’, differentiation came through the interactions, knowledge exchange, and routines continuously undertaken between owners and engineers, between highly-skilled engineers, and between those with craft and new skills. Influencing decisions over operational requirements, and regarding subsequent production and product development reconfigurations, they made strategic differentiation and market-repositioning possible.​[116]​
	The analysis reveals that Japanese SMEs could avoid the dangers of hollowing-out after 1990, and that we need to consider carefully the relationship between broader contemporary trends, managerial decision-making, internal processes, and sustainable competence enhancement during strategic transformation. We can ask, as a second research aim, if the achievements and failures of Japanese SMEs in this period can offer more general insights, or were a product of their time. Our cases highlight how owner-managers were pivotal figures in determining responses to external factors, and, crucially, in initiating internal reorganization. It was they who acquired information about market opportunities, production methods, and product ideas, and they were cognisant of rapid changes in the economy, market structure, and technology. In contrast to IMC, the manager at Precion more astutely considered the enduring advantages of existing resources within their firms, the limits of the new technologies, and the importance of systemic differentiating capabilities.​[117]​ Strategies succeed by retaining a focus on enduring capability development, particularly when under pressure to meet immediate market needs.​[118]​ Prior experience shaped the attitudes and decision-making of owner-managers.​[119]​ IMC’s Namiki succeeded his father after working as a product designer at a larger manufacturer; Precion’s Suzuki stayed with the business during his formative years. Through his extended familiarity with his firm, Suzuki favoured the retention of existing production processes and working relations. Frustrated with his engineers and their practices, Namiki followed many in the sector by placing his trust heavily on computerized machinery. The separation of design and manufacturing negatively affected IMC’s innovative capability. Its owner did not build on his firm’s firm-specific tacit knowledge, and ultimately reduced its specialized, inimitable resources.​[120]​
	Both owner-managers shared similar entrepreneurial capabilities in the identification of strategic opportunities: what distinguished the firms were differences in reconfiguring internal resources.​[121]​ As suggested in the Resource Based View, the IMC and Precion cases suggest that it is not the firm’s resources but their organization and systemization that induces long-term competitive differentiation. The impact of computerized production technologies by themselves on performance or survivability underlines that point, and raises interesting questions about the nature of flexible specialization within SMEs historically and generally. The case studies indicate that SMEs could restructure their combinations of resources and capabilities, and could do so during a period of rapid change. They underline Dynamic Capabilities ideas that stress the role of managers and their ability to sense external opportunities, and implement strategic renewal.​[122]​ The importance of interactions between owner-managers and key personnel in enhancing products and production systems is additionally apparent. The organizational processes by which ﬁrms synthesize knowledge and equipment created distinctive applications of new and established resources at Precion.​[123]​ Shared understanding and trust relationships within the firm rather than individual efforts were determinant. Other Dynamic Capabilities viewpoints stress the importance of firms building, integrating and reconﬁguring competencies as the basis of value-creating strategies. Dynamic Capabilities, it has been argued, share signiﬁcant levels of commonalities, substitutability, or best practice across ﬁrms. Competitive advantage, it follows, lies more precisely in the resource conﬁgurations created by Dynamic Capabilities, not in the Dynamic Capabilities themselves. It is resources that can be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. IMC and Precion provide insights into the origins, characteristics and significance of these resource configurations. Eisenhardt and Martin distinguish between ‘learning-by-doing’, as in Precion’s iterative change process, and ‘learning-before-doing’, as exemplified by IMC’s fuller embrace of new technology. Learning and improvising from concrete experience deepens understanding of existing resources and personnel, with frequent, small variations helping managers to reinforce capabilities and ensure sustainability.​[124]​

Conclusion: Trends in Technology and Skills

Our study adds to our understanding of Japanese business and the wider economy during a critical period of change. Japanese SMEs demonstrated that they possessed and reshaped strategic resources and capabilities in the era of low growth and technological change after 1990, and converted into flexible specialists. The period reveals the potential but also the contemporary limits of computerized machines. The analysis points to the influence of factors external to the firm, the contribution of owner-managers, and the determinant role of internal processes in integrating and systemizing resources and capabilities in the creation of sustainable differentiated competitive advantages. These factors enabled SMEs to adjust their market position away from the pyramid of subcontractors dominated by the strategic needs of large firms and towards greater independence.
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Source: Recalculated from World Bank, Japan, GDP data, GDP constant (2010) data.


Table 2: Japanese Manufacturers by Size of Establishment,
Employees, and Value Added

1990
	Manufacturers	Employees (000s)	%	Number of Firms
	4-9 employees	 1,455,000	13.0	 244,004	
	10-19	 1,193,000	10.7	  86,533	
	20-99	 3,450,000	30.9	  89,213	
	100-299	 1,995,000	17.9	  12,407	
	All SMMs	 8,093,000	 72.4	  432,157	
	Firms 300/+ employees	 3,079,000	 27.6	    3,840	
	Total	11,173,000	 100.0          435,997	

1993
	All Firms			Percentage Employed	Percentage Value Added
	SMMs (10-19 employees)	10.4	6.8
	SMMs (20-99 employees)	30.8	23.9





	Manufacturers	Employees (000s)	%	Gross V.A. (Ybn) 	%	
		4-9 employees	1,115	11.6	  7,071	 5.9
		10-19	1,007	10.1	  7,482	 6.2
		20-99	3,107	31.3	 28,215	23.5
		100-299	1,881	18.9	 23,977	20.0
	SMMs 4-299	7,150 	72.0	 66,745	55.7













Sources: SME Agency (1993, 1997, 2006), White Paper on Small Medium Enterprises in Japan (Tokyo); MITI (1995), Census of Manufacturers (Tokyo).


Table 3: Average Operating Profits, Current and Constant Terms, and Real Growth Per Annum, Japanese SMEs and SMMs, 1996-2005







1999	15,103	17,535		0.8	21,224	24,641	   0.8
2000	18,907	22,556		28.6	29,124	34,745 	 41.0
2001	15,282	18,308		-18.8	21,265	25,476	 - 26.7
2002	13,904	16,671		 - 8.9	18,290	21,930 	- 13.9
2003	15,695	19,101		 14.6	22,921	27,895	   27.2
2004	16,887	21,007		 10.0	27,656	34,404	   23.3
2005	20,100	25,427		 21.0	29,364	37,146	     7.8

Source: Ministry of Finance (2006), Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry (Tokyo).


Table 4: Japanese Manufacturing SMEs: Precion, CIC and IMC
	Precion	CIC	IMC	
Founded	1961	1963	1967	
Founder	Etsuro Suzuku	Isamu Hayashi	Hideaki Namiki	
Location	Kanuma City, Tochigi Prefecture	Hiki District, Saitama Prefecture	Koga City,Ibaraki Prefecture	 
Products	Sheet metal products & fabricator	Plastic automotive accessories	Sheet metal products & fabricator	





Table 5: Definitions of Skill Levels in Japanese SMEs, 2006

Skill Level	Definition	Acquisition Years
Basic Skill	Ability to contribute to production plans under the supervision of senior colleagues	Up to 3 years
Practical Skill	Ability to work independently in achieving production plans	Over 3 to 6 years
Expert Skill	Participation in product or process innovation and flexible responses to customer requirements	Over 6 to 9 years

Source: SME Agency (2006), White Paper on Small Medium Enterprises in Japan (Tokyo): 189.


Table 6: Labor Productivity: Japanese SMM Average, IMC, Precion and CIC
Current and Constant (1989=100) Figures, 1996-2006

	Current Terms	Constant Terms
Year	SMMs	IMC 	Precion	CIC		SMMs	IMC 	Precion 	CIC		
1996	6,140	8,117	6,592	12,805		5,730 	7,575 	6,152 	11,950
1997	6,078	8,472	8,148	15,530		5,644 	7,868 	7,567 	14,422
1998	5,928	5,521	6,079	 8,019		5,507 	5,129 	5,647 	 7,449
1999	5,447	4,963	6,502	 8,399		5,127 	4,672 	6,120 	 7,906
2000	5,588	6,707	9,410	 9,664		5,334 	6,403 	8,983 	 9,225
2001	5,349	6,996	7,297	 8,335		5,163 	6,753 	7,043 	 8,045
2002	5,147	5,418	7,748	 9,288		5,041 	5,307 	7,589 	 9,097
2003	4,976	6,155	8,935	 8,403		4,954 	6,128	8,895 	 8,366
2004	5,355	5,642	9,869	10,581		5,388 	5,677 	9,930 	10,646
2005	5,175	5,848	8,984	 8,940		5,264 	5,948 	9,138 	 9,094
2006	5,335	6,319	7,956	 9,899		5,475 	6,485 	8,164 	10,158

Sources: Recalculated from SME Agency (2006), White Paper on Small Medium Enterprises in Japan, 15; Ministry of Finance (2006), Financial Statements: Statistics of Corporations by Industry; IMC (1996-2005), Financial Statements; Precion (1996-2005), Financial Statements; Hayashi Chemical (1996-2005), Financial Statements. Notes: Labor productivity is value added divided by number of employees. Value added is the sum of operating profit, personnel costs, depreciation, interest expenses, discount charges, and rent from property.

	
Table 7: Operating Profit Margins: Japanese SMM Average, IMC, Precion and CIC,





























Figure 3: IMC’s Production and Skills Architecture, 2002-2005


Figure 4: Precion’s Production and Skills Architecture, 1996-1999
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